Artikel

Building trust: One gift at a time

This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees' loss associated with the cost of giving a gift.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 412-433 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
experimental economics
gift giving
investment game
trust
trustworthiness

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Servátka, Maroés
Tucker, Steven
Vadoviéc, Radovan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2011

DOI
doi:10.3390/g2040412
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Servátka, Maroés
  • Tucker, Steven
  • Vadoviéc, Radovan
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2011

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