Arbeitspapier

Shadow banking and financial stability under limited deposit insurance

I study the relation between shadow banking and financial stability in an economy in which banks are susceptible to self-fulfilling runs and in which government-backed deposit insurance is limited. Shadow banks issue only uninsured deposits while commercial banks issue both insured and uninsured deposits. The effect of shadow banking on financial stability is ambiguous and depends on the (exogenous) upper limit on insured deposits. If the upper limit on insured deposits is high, then the presence of a shadow banking sector is detrimental to financial stability; shadow banking creates systemic instability that would not be present if all deposits were held in the commercial banking sector. In contrast, if the upper limit on insured deposits is low, then the presence of a shadow banking sector is beneficial from a financial stability perspective; shadow banks absorb uninsured (and uninsurable) deposits from the commercial banking sector, thereby shielding commercial banks from runs. While runs may occur in the shadow banking sector, the situation without shadow banks and a larger amount of uninsured deposits held at commercial banks is worse.

ISBN
978-92-9472-119-8
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ESRB Working Paper Series ; No. 105

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Shadow Banking
Deposit Insurance
Bank Runs
Financial Intermediation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Voellmy, Lukas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2019

DOI
doi:10.2849/875514
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Voellmy, Lukas
  • European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), European System of Financial Supervision

Entstanden

  • 2019

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