Strict Incentives and Strategic Uncertainty

Arbeitspapier

This paper proposes a comprehensive perspective on the question of self-enforcing solutions for normal form games. While this question has been widely discussed in the literature, the focus is usually either on strict incentives for players to stay within the proposed solution or on strategic uncertainty, i.e. robustness to trembles. The present approach combines both requirements in proposing the concept of robust sets, i.e. sets of strategy profiles which satisfy both strict incentives and robustness to strategic uncertainty. The result is a set valued solution, a variant of which is shown to exist for all finite normal form games.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7715

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: game theory ; self-enforcing solution ; strict incentives ; strategic uncertainty

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Carlsson, Hans ; Wichardt, Philipp Christoph
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/201941
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET