Economics and politics of international investment agreements

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates the design and implications of international investment agreements. These are ubiquitous, potent and heavily criticized state-to-state treaties that protect foreign investment against host country policies. We show that optimal agreements cause national but not global underregulation ("regulatory chill"). The incentives to form agreements and their distributional consequences depend on countries' unilateral commitment possibilities and the direction of investment flows. The benefits from agreements between developed countries accrue to foreign investors at the expense of the rest of society, but this is not the case for agreements between developed and developing countries.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1140

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; International Law
• Subject: Foreign direct investment ; expropriation ; international investment agreements ; regulatory chill ; Auslandsinvestition ; Internationales Investitionsrecht

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Horn, Henrik ; Tangerås, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/183369
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET