The economics of advance pricing agreements

Arbeitspapier

Advance pricing agreements (APAs) determine transfer prices for intra-firm transactions in advance. This paper interprets these contracts as a means to overcome a hold-up problem that occurs because governments cannot commit to non-excessive future tax rates. In addition, with private information, just as in practice, our APAs will be complex and require lengthy negotiations. Nevertheless, implemented APAs lead to a Pareto improvement even when all agents are risk neutral. However, not all efficient APAs are concluded in equilibrium. International agreements to avoid double taxation will likely reduce the number of realized APAs.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP14/19

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Accounting ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
• Subject: Advance Pricing Agreements ; Corporate Taxation ; Multinational Firms ; Transfer Pricing

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Becker, Johannes ; Davies, Ronald B. ; Jakobs, Gitte
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
• (where): Dublin
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109723
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET