Arbeitspapier

Corporate income taxation of multinationals in a general equilibrium model

This paper contributes to the discussion on Separate Accounting versus Formula Apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The innovation of the analysis is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model with an endogenously determined world interest rate. Under the principle of Separate Accounting, it turns out that corporate tax rates may be inefficiently low or high, while under Formula Apportionment corporate tax rates are always inefficiently low. These results are true independent of whether the number of countries is small or large. They reverse the insights obtained by previous studies under the assumption of an exogenously given world interest rate.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2320

Classification
Wirtschaft
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Subject
corporate income tax
Separate Accounting
Formula Apportionment
Körperschaftsteuer
Multinationales Unternehmen
Formula Apportionment
Steuerbemessung
Steuerbelastung
Steuerwettbewerb
Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Eichner, Thomas
Runkel, Marco
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Eichner, Thomas
  • Runkel, Marco
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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