Arbeitspapier
Regulating complementary input supply: production cost correlation and limited liability
We study the optimal regulation of complementary input supply. The regulator chooses for either a monopolist producing two complementary inputs in fixed proportion, or two independent firms producing one input each. Under independent input supply, nonmonotonic regulatory schemes become optimal for high correlation between input production costs. The optimal regulatory choice depends on the correlation between costs, and on the producers. liability structure. Under limited liability monopolistic input supply gives a higher expected welfare whenever the correlation coefficient is sufficiently small and positive. For higher correlation independent input supply is chosen, and the regulatory scheme is non-monotonic in total costs.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 99-30
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jansen, Willem Johannes
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jansen, Willem Johannes
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 1999
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Regulating complementary input supply: production cost correlation and limited liability
Regulating complementary input supply: production cost correlation and limited liability
Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs
When Liability is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets With Advice
Complementary Platforms
Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: Regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
Quantity-setting oligopolies in complementary input markets: The case of iron ore and coking coal
Liability games
Limited Liability
Alternative or complementary attitudes toward alternative and complementary medicines
Complementary bonding analysis
Complementary resistive switches
Regulating complementary input supply: production cost correlation and limited liability
Regulating complementary input supply: production cost correlation and limited liability
Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs
When Liability is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets With Advice
Complementary Platforms
Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: Regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
Quantity-setting oligopolies in complementary input markets: The case of iron ore and coking coal
Liability games
Limited Liability
Alternative or complementary attitudes toward alternative and complementary medicines
Complementary bonding analysis
Complementary resistive switches
Regulating complementary input supply: production cost correlation and limited liability
Regulating complementary input supply: production cost correlation and limited liability
Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs
When Liability is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets With Advice
Complementary Platforms
Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: Regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
Quantity-setting oligopolies in complementary input markets: The case of iron ore and coking coal
Liability games
Limited Liability
Alternative or complementary attitudes toward alternative and complementary medicines
Complementary bonding analysis