Arbeitspapier
Loan prospecting
We offer a theoretical framework to analyze corporate lending when loan officers must be incentivized to prospect for loans and to transmit the soft information they obtain in that process. We explore how this multi-task agency problem shapes loan officers' compensation, banks' use of soft information in credit approval, and their lending standards. When competition intensifies, prospecting for loans becomes more important and banks' internal agency problem worsens. In response to more competition, banks lower lending standards, may choose to disregard soft and use only hard information in their credit approval, and in that case reduce loan officers to salespeople with steep, volume-based compensation. Our model generates "excessive lending" as banks' optimal response to an internal agency problem.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1439
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
banking
competition
loan officers
multi-task moral-hazard
soft information
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Heider, Florian
Inderst, Roman
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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European Central Bank (ECB)
- (wo)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Heider, Florian
- Inderst, Roman
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Entstanden
- 2012