Arbeitspapier

Loan prospecting

We offer a theoretical framework to analyze corporate lending when loan officers must be incentivized to prospect for loans and to transmit the soft information they obtain in that process. We explore how this multi-task agency problem shapes loan officers' compensation, banks' use of soft information in credit approval, and their lending standards. When competition intensifies, prospecting for loans becomes more important and banks' internal agency problem worsens. In response to more competition, banks lower lending standards, may choose to disregard soft and use only hard information in their credit approval, and in that case reduce loan officers to salespeople with steep, volume-based compensation. Our model generates "excessive lending" as banks' optimal response to an internal agency problem.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1439

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
banking
competition
loan officers
multi-task moral-hazard
soft information

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Heider, Florian
Inderst, Roman
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Heider, Florian
  • Inderst, Roman
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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