Arbeitspapier
Unskilled Workers in an Economy with Skill-Biased Technology
This paper contributes to the search theory of unemployment by endogenously deriving matching functions and surplus sharing rule for skilled and unskilled workers from a wage-posting game. In contrast to previous wage posting models, here both sides of the market are heterogeneous and the resulted matching function can exhibit non-constant returns to scale. The model provides useful explanations for the observed dynamic patterns of within-skill and between-skill wage differentials in the 1970s and 1980s.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 987
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Thema
-
Wage posting
Wage differential
Matching
Technological progress
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Shi, Shouyong
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Kingston (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Shi, Shouyong
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1999