Arbeitspapier

Unskilled Workers in an Economy with Skill-Biased Technology

This paper contributes to the search theory of unemployment by endogenously deriving matching functions and surplus sharing rule for skilled and unskilled workers from a wage-posting game. In contrast to previous wage posting models, here both sides of the market are heterogeneous and the resulted matching function can exhibit non-constant returns to scale. The model provides useful explanations for the observed dynamic patterns of within-skill and between-skill wage differentials in the 1970s and 1980s.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 987

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Thema
Wage posting
Wage differential
Matching
Technological progress

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Shi, Shouyong
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
1999

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Shi, Shouyong
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1999

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