Unskilled Workers in an Economy with Skill-Biased Technology

Arbeitspapier

This paper contributes to the search theory of unemployment by endogenously deriving matching functions and surplus sharing rule for skilled and unskilled workers from a wage-posting game. In contrast to previous wage posting models, here both sides of the market are heterogeneous and the resulted matching function can exhibit non-constant returns to scale. The model provides useful explanations for the observed dynamic patterns of within-skill and between-skill wage differentials in the 1970s and 1980s.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 987

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• Subject: Wage posting ; Wage differential ; Matching ; Technological progress

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Shi, Shouyong
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (where): Kingston (Ontario)
• (when): 1999

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189277
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET