Arbeitspapier

Attention and Selection Effects

Who participates in transactions when information about the consequences must be learned? We show theoretically that decision makers for whom acquiring and processing information is more costly respond more strongly to changes in incentive payments for participating and decide to participate based on worse information. With higher payments, the pool of participants thus consists of a larger proportion of individuals who have a worse understanding of the consequences of their decision. We conduct a behavioral experiment that confirms these predictions, both for experimental variation in the costs of information acquisition and for various measures of information costs, including school grades and cognitive ability. These findings are relevant for any transaction combining a payment for participation with uncertain yet learnable consequences.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7091

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Thema
rational inattention
incentives
selection effects
cognitive ability
experiment
repugnant transactions

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ambuehl, Sandro
Ockenfels, Axel
Stewart, Colin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ambuehl, Sandro
  • Ockenfels, Axel
  • Stewart, Colin
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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