Arbeitspapier

Persuasive Advertising in Oligopoly: A Linear State Differential Game

We investigate a linear state differential oligopoly game with advertising, under either Cournot or Bertrand competition. We show that a unique saddlepoint equilibrium exists in both cases if the marginal cost of advertising is sufficiently low. Then, we prove that Bertrand competition entails more intense advertising than Cournot competition. This is due to the fact that enhancing reservation prices is more relevant to firms when market competition is tougher. Ultimately, this may entail that Cournot outperforms Bertrand when it comes to social welfare.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 564

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Oligopol
Werbung
Spieltheorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2006

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4723
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cellini, Roberto
  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Mantovani, Andrea
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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