Advertising with Spillover Effects in a Differential Oligopoly Game With Differentiated Goods

Arbeitspapier

We consider a differentiated oligopoly where firms compete a la Cournot in the market phase, and each firms may invest in advertising activity, to enlarge its market size. Each firm`s advertising effort has positive external effects on the market size of all rivals. We derive the open-loop (and the coincident closed-loop) Nash equilibrium, and the optimal behavior of a cartel involving all firms setting both quantities and advertising efforts so as to maximize joint profits. The comparative assessment of these equilibria shows that a cartel may produce a steady ste where social welfare is higher than the social welfare level associated wit the non-cooperative setting. This is due to the positive externalities from advertising activity.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 430

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lambertini, Luca ; Cellini, Roberto
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (wo): Bologna
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4868
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159271
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ