Arbeitspapier
Education and social mobility
This paper shows that the design of education policy involves a potential conflict between welfare and social mobility. We consider a setting in which social mobility is maximized under the least elitist public education system, whereas welfare maximization calls for the most elitist system. We show that when private education is available, the degree of elitism that maximizes social mobility increases, while the welfare-maximizing degree of elitism decreases. The ranking between the welfare- and mobility-maximizing degree of elitism may even be reversed. Utilitarian welfare is always higher when private supplementary education is available, but social mobility may be reduced.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2951
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Education
Education: Government Policy
- Subject
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elitism
egalitarianism
private education
Privatschule
Elite
Bildungsverhalten
Soziale Mobilität
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cremer, Helmuth
De Donder, Philippe
Pestieau, Pierre
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cremer, Helmuth
- De Donder, Philippe
- Pestieau, Pierre
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2010