Arbeitspapier

Education and social mobility

This paper shows that the design of education policy involves a potential conflict between welfare and social mobility. We consider a setting in which social mobility is maximized under the least elitist public education system, whereas welfare maximization calls for the most elitist system. We show that when private education is available, the degree of elitism that maximizes social mobility increases, while the welfare-maximizing degree of elitism decreases. The ranking between the welfare- and mobility-maximizing degree of elitism may even be reversed. Utilitarian welfare is always higher when private supplementary education is available, but social mobility may be reduced.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2951

Classification
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Education
Education: Government Policy
Subject
elitism
egalitarianism
private education
Privatschule
Elite
Bildungsverhalten
Soziale Mobilität
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cremer, Helmuth
De Donder, Philippe
Pestieau, Pierre
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cremer, Helmuth
  • De Donder, Philippe
  • Pestieau, Pierre
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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