How to control civil servants: Designing and testing a solution informed by game theory

Artikel

A fundamental challenge in democracy is how to control civil service organizations. This challenge has been primarily addressed by creating horizontal accountability arrangements, in which independent agencies act as auditors and evaluators of civil service organizations. However, horizontal accountability only partially resolves this control challenge. In this paper, we adopt a design science approach and draw on insights from game theory to develop a set of design principles for controlling civil service organizations. Based on these design principles, a system for controlling civil service staff was created and implemented in a medium-sized Dutch municipality. The results obtained in this municipality are rather promising regarding the enhanced efficiency and transparency of the civil service organization, while the high level of job satisfaction among civil servants is sustained. These findings suggest that the benefits of increased transparency in how civil servants are monitored appear to outweigh the fact that they may have less discretion in their work.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Administrative Sciences ; ISSN: 2076-3387 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 1-17

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Öffentliche Verwaltung
• Thema: civil service ; control ; performance management ; public administration ; game theory ; design science

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Romme, A. Georges L. ; van de Loo, Harry ; Dankbaar, Bernard
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): MDPI
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2022

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3390/admsci12020053
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/275324
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ