Comparative Dynamics

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops a dynamic evolutionary model in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria. We distinguish two classes of learned behavior: imitative dynamics and a new class of dynamics, "introspective dynamics." Under imitative dynamics, agents compare payoffs of different agents in the population and tend to imitate more successful behavior in the population. Under introspective dynamics, agents compare their own current with past payoffs and tend to select actions that provide higher payoffs. With introspective dynamics, under weak regularity conditions, the stochastically stable set of states is contained in the set of Nash equilibria, providing a novel rationale for Nash equilibrium behavior. With imitative dynamics, under mild regularity conditions there is a unique stochastically stable state, bit it is not a Nash equilibrium. We consider both forms of dynamics in the contexts of games satisfying strategic substitutes and strategic complements.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 981

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: Introspectively Stable ; Imitatively Stable ; Nash Equilibrium ; Relative Equilibrium ; Strategic Substitutes ; Strategic Complements

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bergin, James ; Bernhardt, Dan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (where): Kingston (Ontario)
• (when): 1999

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189272
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET