Arbeitspapier

Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer’s model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer’s model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: EERI Research Paper Series ; No. 25/2009

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
Forchheimer
Dominant firm
Price leadership

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Tasnádi, Attila
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)
(where)
Brussels
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Tasnádi, Attila
  • Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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