Arbeitspapier
Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm
We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer’s model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer’s model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: EERI Research Paper Series ; No. 25/2009
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Subject
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Forchheimer
Dominant firm
Price leadership
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Tasnádi, Attila
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)
- (where)
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Brussels
- (when)
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2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Tasnádi, Attila
- Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)
Time of origin
- 2009