Arbeitspapier

Inattentive Voters and Welfare-State Persistence

Welfare-state measures often tend to persist even when they seem to have become suboptimal due to changes in the economic environment. This paper proposes an information-based explanation for the persistence of the welfare state. I present a structural model where rationally inattentive voters decide upon implementations and removals of social insurance. In this model, welfare-state persistence arises from disincentive effects of social insurance on attentiveness. The welfare state crowds out private financial precautions and with it agents' attentiveness to changes in economic fundamentals. When welfare-state arrangements are pronounced, agents realize changes in economic fundamentals later and reforms have considerable delays.

ISBN
978-3-86788-247-7
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 214

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Social Security and Public Pensions
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
welfare state
voting
imperfect information

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bredemeier, Christian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
(wo)
Essen
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bredemeier, Christian
  • Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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