Arbeitspapier

Organizational equilibrium with capital

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept organizational equilibrium for models with state variables that have a time inconsistency problem. The key elements of this equilibrium concept are: (1) agents are allowed to ignore the history and restart the equilibrium; (2) agents can wait for future agents to start the equilibrium. We apply this equilibrium concept to a quasigeometric discounting growth model and to a problem of optimal dynamic fiscal policy. We find that the allocation gradually transits from that implied by its Markov perfect equilibrium towards that implied by the solution under commitment, but stopping short of the Ramsey outcome. The feature that the time inconsistency problem is resolved slowly over time rationalizes the notion that good will is valuable but has to be built gradually.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2018-20

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bassetto, Marco
Huo, Zhen
Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
(wo)
Chicago, IL
(wann)
2018

DOI
doi:10.21033/wp-2018-20
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bassetto, Marco
  • Huo, Zhen
  • Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Entstanden

  • 2018

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