Prices versus Quantities with Morally Concerned Consumers

Konferenzbeitrag

It is widely believed that an environmental tax (price regulation) and cap-and-trade (quantity regulation) are equally efficient in controlling pollution when there is no uncertainty. We show that this is not the case if some consumers (firms, local governments) are morally concerned about pollution and the pollution price is inefficiently low for political reasons. Emissions are lower and material welfare is higher with price regulation. Furthermore, quantity regulation gives rise to dysfunctional incentive and distribution effects. It shifts the burden of adjustment to the poor and discourages voluntary efforts to reduce pollution, while price regulation makes these efforts effective.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy
• Thema: Emissions Trading ; Carbon Tax ; Climate Change ; Prices versusQuantities ; Behavioral Industrial Organization

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schmidt, Klaus ; Herweg, Fabian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
• (wo): Kiel, Hamburg
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/242371
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ