Arbeitspapier

The role of consent and uncertainty in the formation of customary international law

This contribution analyzes the role of consent in the formation of customary law. It will challenge the assumption that customary norms cannot bind states against their will. Relying on game theory, it will distinguish between different situations and argue that the role of consent differs according to the structure of the social problem that a potential norm is supposed to address. We will approach the topic in two steps. First, there will be a short review of the academic literature on the issue of consent in the formation of customary norms (1.). Second, I will propose a taxonomy of three different situations and propose individual solutions for each of these situations (2.).

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2011,4

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Internationales Recht
Gewohnheitsrecht
Spieltheorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Petersen, Niels
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Petersen, Niels
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2011

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