Arbeitspapier

The coevolution of behavior and normative expectations: Customary law in the lab

Customary law has been criticized from very different angles. Rational choice theorists claim that what looks like custom is nothing but self-interest. Positivists doubt that anything beyond consent assumes the force of law. In this paper, we adopt an experimental approach to test these claims. We show that the willingness to overcome a dilemma transcends self-interest. Cooperation is significantly higher in the presence of a meta-rule for the formation of customary law. Yet only if it is backed up by sanctions, law is significantly more effective than mere comity. Customary law guides behaviour into the normatively desired direction as normative expectations and behavioural patterns coevolve.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2011,32

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Externalities
Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
Thema
Experiment
Public Good
Customary Law
Normativity
Crowding Out
Gewohnheitsrecht
Verhaltensökonomik
Soziale Norm
Crowding out
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Engel, Christoph
Kurschilgen, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Engel, Christoph
  • Kurschilgen, Michael
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2011

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