Arbeitspapier

Alternating Offers in Economic Environments

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard optimization packages is straightforward.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 05-064/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Subject
Bargaining
Negotiation
Alternating offers
subgame perfect equilibrium
Nash bargaining solution
Maximum Theorem
Applied General Equilibrium
Verhandlungstheorie
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Dynamisches Spiel
Theorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Houba, Harold
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Houba, Harold
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2005

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