Arbeitspapier
Alternating Offers in Economic Environments
The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard optimization packages is straightforward.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 05-064/1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Subject
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Bargaining
Negotiation
Alternating offers
subgame perfect equilibrium
Nash bargaining solution
Maximum Theorem
Applied General Equilibrium
Verhandlungstheorie
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Dynamisches Spiel
Theorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Houba, Harold
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Houba, Harold
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2005