Debt Stabilization and Debt Mutualization in a Monetary Union with Endogenous Risk Premia

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we analyse debt stabilization in a monetary union that features endogenous risk premia. In particular, we analyse debt stabilization in two diametrically opposed regimes. In the first regime, the “national fiscal discipline regime”, financial markets impose sovereign risk premia based on each country’s government debt level. In the second regime, the “eurobondsRegime”, financial markets impose a risk premium based on the average debt level in the mone-tary union. We compare outcomes in both regimes using simulations of a number of relevant scenarios.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5564

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models ; National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt ; Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt ; Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
• Thema: Eurobonds ; sovereign debt sustainability ; sovereign debt crisis

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Engwerda, Jacob ; van Aarle, Bas ; Weeren, Arie
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123198
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ