Coalition formation among farsighted agents

Artikel

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 286-298 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: coalition formation ; farsighted players ; stability

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Herings, P. Jean-Jacques ; Mauleon, Ana ; Vannetelbosch, Vincent
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): MDPI
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2010

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g1030286
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98568
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET