Artikel
Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation
We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 159-167 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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core
hedonic games
three-sided matching
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lazarova, Emiliya
Dimitrov, Dinko
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2010
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g1020159
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Lazarova, Emiliya
- Dimitrov, Dinko
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2010