Artikel

Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 159-167 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
core
hedonic games
three-sided matching

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lazarova, Emiliya
Dimitrov, Dinko
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2010

DOI
doi:10.3390/g1020159
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Lazarova, Emiliya
  • Dimitrov, Dinko
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2010

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