Advertising, competition and entry in media industries

Arbeitspapier

This paper presents a model of media competition with free entry when media operators are financed both from advertisers and customers. The relation between advertising receipts and sales receipts, which are both complementary and antagonist, is different if media operators impose a price or a quantity to advertisers. When consumers dislike advertising, media operators are better off setting an advertising price than an advertising quantity. We establish a relationship between the equilibrium levels (advertising and entry) and the advertising technology. In particular, media operators? profit is not affected by the introduction of advertising when they impose advertising quantities and when advertising exhibits constant returns to scale in the audience size. Under constant or increasing returns to scale in the audience size, we find an excessive level of entry and an insufficient level of advertising.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1591

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Entertainment; Media ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: media ; advertising ; free entry ; two-sided markets ; Werbung ; Markteintritt ; Werbewirtschaft ; Unvollkommener Markt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Crampes, Claude ; Haritchabalet, Carole ; Jullien, Bruno
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19055
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ