Konferenzbeitrag

Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests

This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, 2006). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage of the overconfident agent in absolute terms.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Principal Agent Problems ; No. G15-V1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
Overconfidence
Contests

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ludwig, Sandra
Wichardt, Philipp C.
Wickhorst, Hanke
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Verein für Socialpolitik
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Ludwig, Sandra
  • Wichardt, Philipp C.
  • Wickhorst, Hanke
  • Verein für Socialpolitik

Time of origin

  • 2010

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