Konferenzbeitrag
Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests
This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, 2006). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage of the overconfident agent in absolute terms.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Principal Agent Problems ; No. G15-V1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Overconfidence
Contests
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ludwig, Sandra
Wichardt, Philipp C.
Wickhorst, Hanke
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Verein für Socialpolitik
- (where)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Ludwig, Sandra
- Wichardt, Philipp C.
- Wickhorst, Hanke
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Time of origin
- 2010