Auctions and corruption

Arbeitspapier

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2000,40

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions
• Subject: auctions ; procurement ; corruption ; collusion ; coalitions

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lengwiler, Yvan ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62255
• URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047498
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET