Aggressiveness and Redistribution

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to produce as a result of the existens of externalities in the conflict equilibrium. We were able to show the following results: (i) In some situations Pareto-improving redistribution occurs voluntarily. (ii) Otherwise, the government may choose an indirect way to improve production in the presence of appropriation: In a situation of partial anarchy in some market redistributive policies in other markets may help to reduce the inefficiency in the anarchic market.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 2/2003

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Distribution: General ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
• Thema: Anarchy ; Contests ; Redistribution ; Einkommensumverteilung ; Verteilungskonflikt ; Spieltheorie ; Eigentumsrechtstheorie ; Anarchie ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bös, Dieter ; Kolmar, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22835
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ