Defectors’ intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
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2045-2322
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Defectors’ intolerance of others promotes cooperation in the repeated public goods game with opting out ; volume:10 ; number:1 ; day:11 ; month:11 ; year:2020 ; pages:1-12 ; date:12.2020
Scientific reports ; 10, Heft 1 (11.11.2020), 1-12, 12.2020
- Urheber
-
Křivan, Vlastimil
Cressman, Ross
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1038/s41598-020-76506-3
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020121818104107444952
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 15.08.2025, 07:36 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Křivan, Vlastimil
- Cressman, Ross
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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