Social Objectivity and the Problem of Local Epistemologies

Abstract: The value-freedom of scientific knowledge is commonly hold to be a necessary condition for objectivity. Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism aims to overcome this connection. She questions the suitability of the normative ideal of value-freedom and develops an alternative conception of objectivity, which integrates social and epistemic aspects of scientific enquiry. The function of this notion of ‘social objectivity’ is to make value-laden assumptions assessable through a process of criticism, even if there cannot be any guarantee of their elimination. This assessability requires common standards of evaluation, which are threatened by Longino’s rejection of the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive values guiding theory choice. I will argue that in order to resolve this inherent tension, social objectivity has to be understood as based on a procedural epistemology and, differing from Longino’s own approach, must include the normative requirement to strive for consensus instead of allowing for epistemological pluralism.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Social Objectivity and the Problem of Local Epistemologies ; volume:32 ; number:2 ; year:2010 ; pages:213-230 ; extent:18 ; Analyse & Kritik ; 32, Heft 2 (2010), 213-230 (gesamt 18)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Büter, Anke

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/auk-2010-0202
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2404171629303.564458954916
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 14.08.2025, 11:05 AM CEST