Arbeitspapier
Designing central bank digital currencies
We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC, and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of a payment instrument depend on the number of its users. A CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank's tradeoff.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ADBI Working Paper Series ; No. 1065
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Demand for Money
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Thema
-
CBDC
fintech
digital currency
financial intermediation
network effects
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Agur, Itai
Ari, Anil
Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI)
- (wo)
-
Tokyo
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Agur, Itai
- Ari, Anil
- Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni
- Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI)
Entstanden
- 2019