Arbeitspapier

Designing central bank digital currencies

We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC, and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of a payment instrument depend on the number of its users. A CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank's tradeoff.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ADBI Working Paper Series ; No. 1065

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Demand for Money
Central Banks and Their Policies
Thema
CBDC
fintech
digital currency
financial intermediation
network effects

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Agur, Itai
Ari, Anil
Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI)
(wo)
Tokyo
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Agur, Itai
  • Ari, Anil
  • Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni
  • Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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