Arbeitspapier

Cooperating over losses and competing over gains: A social dilemma experiment

Evidence from studies in international relations, the politics of reform, collective action and price competition suggests that economic agents in social dilemma situations cooperate more to avoid losses than in the pursuit of gains. To test whether the prospect of losses can induce cooperation, we let experimental subjects play the traveler's dilemma in the gain and loss domain. Subjects cooperate substantially more over losses. Our experimental design allows us to show that this treatment effect is best explained by reference-dependent risk preferences and referencedependent strategic sophistication. We discuss policy implications and relate our findings to other experimental games played in the loss domain.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2016-2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Thema
cooperation
traveler's dilemma
social dilemma
loss domain
diminishing sensitivity
cognitive hierarchy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ispano, Alessandro
Schwardmann, Peter
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.27576
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-27576-4
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ispano, Alessandro
  • Schwardmann, Peter
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2016

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