Arbeitspapier
Mechanism Design with Moral Hazard
This paper studies dynamic mechanism design in the presence of moral hazard. Revelation principle extends to models with moral hazard for both full commitment and limited commitment, but I also identify environments in which the principal doesn’t benefit from eliciting agents’ private information or beliefs. One-shot deviation principle requires the knowledge of agents’ private strategies after deviations, and I characterize the necessary and sufficient condition for all IC constraints that requires only the knowledge of agents’ equilibrium strategies. I also provide two sufficient conditions for smaller set of IC constraints that require obedience after a single-period deviation to be sufficient for all IC constraints. I illustrate how to apply revelation principle and the smaller set of IC constraints with an application allowing for endogenous state.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6621
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
dynamic mechanism design
adverse selection
moral hazard
revelation principle
one-shot deviation principle
endogenous state
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kwon, Suehuyn
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kwon, Suehuyn
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2017
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