Ceding Control: An Experimental Analysis of Participatory Management

Arbeitspapier

We use an experiment to evaluate the effects of participatory management on firm performance. Participants are randomly assigned roles as managers or workers in firms that generate output via real effort. To identify the causal effect of participation on effort, workers are exogenously assigned to one of two treatments: one in which the manager implements a compensation scheme unilaterally or another in which the manager cedes control over compensation to the workers who vote to implement a scheme. We find that output is between seven and twelve percentage points higher in participatory firms.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10576

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence ; Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms; Employee Ownership ; Personnel Economics: General
• Subject: voice ; control ; intrinsic motivation ; participatory management ; real effort ; experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Mellizo, Philip ; Carpenter, Jeffrey P. ; Matthews, Peter Hans
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161199
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET