Thoughts on Arrangements of Property Rights in Productive Assets

Abstract: State ownership, worker ownership, and household ownership are the three main forms in which productive assets (firms) can be held. I argue that worker ownership is not wise in economies with high capital-labor ratios, for it forces the worker to concentrate all her assets in one firm. I review the coupon economy that I proposed in 1994, and express reservations that it could work: greedy people would be able to circumvent its purpose of preventing the concentration of corporate wealth. Although extremely high corporate salaries are the norm today, I argue these are competitive and market determined, a consequence of the gargantuan size of firms. It would, however, be possible to tax such salaries at high rates, because the labor - supply response would be small. The social-democratic model remains the best one, to date, for producing a relatively egalitarian outcome, and it relies on solidarity, redistribution, and private ownership of firms. Whether a solidaristic social ethos can develop without a conflagration, such as the second world war, which not only united populations in the war effort, but also wiped out substantial middle-class wealth in Europe - thus engendering the post-war movement towards social - insurance is an open question.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Thoughts on Arrangements of Property Rights in Productive Assets ; volume:35 ; number:1 ; year:2013 ; pages:55-64 ; extent:10 ; Analyse & Kritik ; 35, Heft 1 (2013), 55-64 (gesamt 10)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Roemer, John E.

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/auk-2013-0105
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2404171644332.003598456479
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 14.08.2025, 10:47 AM CEST