Arbeitspapier

Do Democracies Breed Rent-Seeking Behavior?

Using objective institutional historical data we test the link between extent, duration, and transparency in democracies and rent-seeking behavior using time-series and panel data approaches. In this paper we focus on the case of Uruguay, an ethnically homogeneous country. We find three main results. First, democratic regimes are negatively linked with rent-seeking actions. Second, the longer the duration of democracy, the less rent-seeking in a society. Third, legislation enacted more transparently is negatively correlated with rent-seeking behavior. Our results are robust to the use of different econometric methods and basic robustness tests and are consistent with prevailing theory.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 534

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Rent-Seeking
Demokratie
Korruption
Uruguay

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Calderón, César
Chong, Alberto
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department
(where)
Washington, DC
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Calderón, César
  • Chong, Alberto
  • Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department

Time of origin

  • 2005

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