Arbeitspapier

Should UI Benefits Really Fall over Time?

The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in an analytically tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden savings. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the unemployment spell, benefits should typically increase or be constant. The only exception is when there is moral hazard and no hidden savings. In general, adverse selection problems calls for increasing benefits, moral hazard problems for constant benefits and decreasing search productivity for decreasing benefits.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 804

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
unemployment benefits
search
moral hazard
adverse selection

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hassler, John
Mora, José V. Rodriguez
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hassler, John
  • Mora, José V. Rodriguez
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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