Arbeitspapier

Social Comparisons in Oligopsony

A large body of evidence suggests that social comparisons matter for workers’ valuation of the wage they receive. The consequences of social comparisons in imperfectly competitive labor markets are less well understood. We analyze an oligopsonistic model of the labor market where workers derive (dis-) utility from comparing their own wage with wages paid at other firms. As social comparisons become more prevalent all workers are paid higher wages, the wage distribution becomes more equal, and employment shifts to high productivity firms. Moreover, the total wage bill and output increase, while aggregate profits decline. Overall welfare rises. Our theoretical results have implications for estimating the elasticity of the labor supply curve facing a firm.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6528

Classification
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
Subject
social comparisons
status seeking
oligopsony
wage distribution
functional income distribution
welfare

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Goerke, Laszlo
Neugart, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Neugart, Michael
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2017

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