Higher-order beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma

Arbeitspapier

Do experimental subjects have consistent first and higher-order beliefs about others? How does any inconsistency affect strategic decisions? We introduce a simple four-player sequential social dilemma where actions reveal first and higher-order beliefs. The unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is observed less than 5% of the time, even though our diagnostic treatments show that a majority of our subjects are self-interested, higher-order rational and have accurate first-order beliefs. In our data, strategic play deviates substantially from Nash predictions because first-order and higher-order beliefs are inconsistent for most subjects. We construct and operationalize an epistemic model of belief hierarchies to estimate that less than 10% of subjects have consistent first and higher-order beliefs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 356

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
• Thema: Experimental economics ; Higher-order beliefs ; Social dilemma

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Calford, Evan M. ; Chakraborty, Anujit
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of California, Department of Economics
• (wo): Davis, CA
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/283199
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ