The Pareto-frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation

Arbeitspapier

We characterize the Pareto-frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation. We show how the second-best frontier which incorporates incentive constraints due to private information on productive abilities relates to the first-best frontier which takes only resource constraints into account. In particular, we argue that the second-best frontier can be interpreted as a Laffer-curve. We also use this second-best frontier for a comparative statics analysis of how optimal income tax rates vary with the degree of inequity aversion, and for a characterization of optimal public-good provision. We show that a more inequity averse policy maker chooses tax schedules that are more redistributive and involve higher marginal tax rates, but chooses a lower public-goods provision level.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,16

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Public Goods ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: Optimal Income Taxation ; Laffer-Curve ; Public-Good Provision. ; Einkommensteuer ; Optimale Besteuerung ; Optimale Verteilung ; Laffer-Kurve ; Einkommensteuerpolitik ; Soziale Gerechtigkeit ; Öffentliches Gut ; Versorgung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bierbrauer, Felix ; Boyer, Pierre C.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38858
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ