Artikel
Private value takeover auctions with toeholds: An experimental study
This paper presents the results of an experimental study of takeover auctions with toeholds. Consistent with the theory, we find a positive effect of toeholds on bidding. Such an effect, however, is of a lower magnitude and the bidding premium function has an opposite slope than the theory predicts, which can be attributed both to risk aversion and subjects' tendency to think of their bids in relative terms. Consistent with the theory we find no cross-bidder toehold effect, however, such a result is inconsistent with the observed bidding function if people expect their opponents to behave the same way as they do.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 1-10 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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auction
takeover
toehold
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Dodonova, Anna
Khoroshilov, Yuri
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g12020040
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Dodonova, Anna
- Khoroshilov, Yuri
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2021
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