Arbeitspapier
Imitation in Heterogeneous Populations
We study a boundedly rational model of imitation when payoff distributions of actions differ across types of individuals. Individuals observe others’ actions and payoffs, and a comparison signal. One of two inefficiencies always arises: (i) uniform adoption, i.e., all individuals choose the action that is optimal for one type but sub-optimal for the other, or (ii) dual incomplete learning, i.e., only a fraction of each type chooses its optimal action. Which one occurs depends on the composition of the population and how critical the choice is for different types of individuals. In an application, we show that a monopolist serving a population of boundedly rational consumers cannot fully extract the surplus of high-valuation consumers, but can sell to consumers who do not value the good.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 625
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
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Imitation
heterogeneous populations
bounded rationality
Fubini extension
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Hedlund, Jonas
Oyarzun, Carlos
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Heidelberg
- (wann)
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2016
- DOI
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doi:10.11588/heidok.00022241
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-222416
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hedlund, Jonas
- Oyarzun, Carlos
- University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2016