Arbeitspapier

The Limited Liability Effect in Experimental Duopoly Markets

Brander and Lewis argue in a seminal paper (AER, 1986) that a firm's debt-equity ratio should have important strategic effects on product market competition. We test their model in a duopoly experiment under both, Bertrand and Cournot competition. We find that leverage has strategic effects, but those effects are much weaker than predicted by theory. Specifically, we find for price competition a general tendency towards collusion, which has the same overall consequences - but deviates from - the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. With quantity competition subjects choose much less debt than predicted by theory. It appears that subjects recognize the strategic effects of their own debt. However, they do not (want to) acknowledge possible strategic advantages of opponents' debt.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 36/2001

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Subject
oligopoly
bankruptcy
debt-equity ratio

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Oechssler, Jörg
Schuhmacher, Frank
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Oechssler, Jörg
  • Schuhmacher, Frank
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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