Arbeitspapier
The Better Route to Global Tax Coordination: Gradualism or Multilateralism?
In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about tax coordination under complete and incomplete information. We identify the conditions for multilateral negotiations to be more likely to be successful than gradual/sequential negotiation approaches and compare different routes of sequential bargaining. Under plausible conditions, full-scale global coordination is least likely to emerge if the negotiations take place sequentially, and if the negotiations with the most unpredictable country take place last.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7305
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
National Security; Economic Nationalism
International Institutional Arrangements
- Thema
-
tax competition
tax cooperation
multilateral negotiations
sequential negotiations
ultimatum bargaining
acceptance uncertainty
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Konrad, Kai A.
Thum, Marcel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Thum, Marcel
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018
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