Artikel
Do resource sanctions work?
Damage created by an export embargo on exhaustible resources is typically much smaller than the foregone revenues. Sanctions prompt the sanctioned country to extract resources later. With competitive resource markets, sanctions create no costs-to any of the countries. With non-price takers, the sanctioned country and worldwide consumers suffer losses. With insecure property rights, sanctions hurt the autocrat most if his or her job security is low, but his international financial assets are safe.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: EconPol Forum ; ISSN: 2752-1184 ; Volume: 24 ; Year: 2023 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 23-26
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Konrad, Kai A.
Thum, Marcel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
CESifo GmbH
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Thum, Marcel
- CESifo GmbH
Entstanden
- 2023
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