Arbeitspapier
Institutional investors and corporate investment
Using investors' trading horizons to capture their incentives to collect information and monitor management's decisions, this paper shows that an increase in the ownership stake held by long-term institutional investors is associated with a subsequent decrease in real investment precisely in firms that invest too much. In support of the monitoring hypothesis, we show that results are driven by the purchases of long-term investors, while quasi-indexers and short-term investors have no influence on investment. We address the potential problem of endogeneity using the inclusion of a firm to the S&P 500 Index as an exogenous shock to institutional holdings.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 373
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies; Capacity
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- Thema
-
Institutional ownership
investors' investment horizons
over-investment
under-investment
management monitoring
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cella, Cristina
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sveriges Riksbank
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cella, Cristina
- Sveriges Riksbank
Entstanden
- 2019