Arbeitspapier

Institutional investors and corporate investment

Using investors' trading horizons to capture their incentives to collect information and monitor management's decisions, this paper shows that an increase in the ownership stake held by long-term institutional investors is associated with a subsequent decrease in real investment precisely in firms that invest too much. In support of the monitoring hypothesis, we show that results are driven by the purchases of long-term investors, while quasi-indexers and short-term investors have no influence on investment. We address the potential problem of endogeneity using the inclusion of a firm to the S&P 500 Index as an exogenous shock to institutional holdings.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 373

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies; Capacity
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Thema
Institutional ownership
investors' investment horizons
over-investment
under-investment
management monitoring

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cella, Cristina
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sveriges Riksbank
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cella, Cristina
  • Sveriges Riksbank

Entstanden

  • 2019

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