Moral hazard and sickness insurance: Empirical evidence from a sickness insurance reform in Sweden

Arbeitspapier

We use a reform of Sweden’s sickness insurance system as a source of exogenous variation to analyse the presence of moral hazard. As a result of the reform, the replacement level was reduced from 90 percent of forgone earnings to 65 percent for the first three days; to 80 percent between day 4 and 90; and remained at 90 percent after 90 days. We find that the incidence of work absence decreased due to the decrease in compensation level and that effect on duration is in accordance with moral hazard in the sickness insurance. We estimate the elasticities of the incidence with respect to forgone earning to -1 for males and -0.70 for females.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2004:10

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies ; National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs ; Time Allocation and Labor Supply ; Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
• Subject: Worker absenteeism ; Cox proportional hazard models ; regression-discontinuity

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Johansson, Per ; Palme, Mårten
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
• (where): Uppsala
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82149
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET