Do interactions between unemployment insurance and sickness insurance affect transitions to employment?

Arbeitspapier

Previous research suggests that there are substantial interactions between the unemployment insurance (UI) and the sickness insurance (SI) in Sweden. Moral hazard arises in the interplay between these two social insurance systems, since by reporting sick an unemployed person can postpone the UI expiration date and someÿ­times also receive considerably higher benefits. This paper examines whether these interactions affect the transition rate from unemployment to employment. To study this question I utilize a reform which greatly reduced the incentives for unemployed persons to transfer to the SI. While there is evidence that this reform substantially lowered the incidence of sick reports among the unemployed, I find no evidence suggesting that the reduced sick reÿ­port rate in turn affected the transition rate to employment.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2008:18

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
• Thema: Unemployment insurance ; sickness insurance ; unemployment duration ; health ; duration analysis ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung ; Arbeitslosigkeit ; Krankheit ; Dauer ; Moral Hazard ; Schweden

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hall, Caroline
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
• (wo): Uppsala
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45760
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ